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COMBATING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE 
FORMERLY INCARCERATED IN THE  
LABOR MARKET 
Ifeoma Ajunwa & Angela Onwuachi-Willig 
ABSTRACT—Both discrimination by private employers and governmental 
restrictions in the form of statutes that prohibit professional licensing serve 
to exclude the formerly incarcerated from much of the labor market. This 
Essay explores and analyzes potential legislative and contractual means for 
removing these barriers to labor market participation by the formerly 
incarcerated. First, as a means of addressing discrimination by the state, Part 
I of this Essay explores the ways in which the adoption of racial impact 
statements—which mandate that legislators consider statistical analyses of 
the potential impact their proposed legislation may have on racial and ethnic 
groups prior to enacting such legislation—could help to reduce labor market 
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated. In so doing, this Part 
analyzes the influence of racial impact statements in the few states that have 
implemented them. Part II of this Essay examines the possibility of a 
contractual solution that could help to decrease discrimination against the 
formerly incarcerated in the private labor market, particularly by those 
employers who rely on the labor of imprisoned individuals. Specifically, this 
Part uses the fact that many private corporations rely on and profit from low-
wage prison labor to argue that the state penal institutions that lease prisoners 
to such corporations should push for contractual agreements that stipulate 
that corporations relying on prison labor must revoke policies that bar 
employing the formerly incarcerated upon their release. In addition, this Part 
explicates how contractual stipulations may also provide for affirmative 
hiring policies for the formerly incarcerated. Finally, this Essay concludes 
by highlighting how failure to address continued labor market discrimination 
against the formerly incarcerated could render the formerly incarcerated a 
permanent economic underclass, thereby undermining notions of fairness 
and equality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider Shon Hopwood, a white man who robbed a bank at gunpoint 
in August of 1997, escaped with $50,000, and managed to perform four more 
robberies before the authorities eventually caught and arrested him.1 
Following Hopwood’s capture, authorities brought him to justice for his 
robberies, and he ultimately served eleven years in federal prison.2 While in 
prison, Hopwood worked at the prison law library and wrote briefs to appeal 
his case and the cases of other inmates; in fact, the third brief that Hopwood 
ever wrote was accepted as part of a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, a 
 
 1 See Susan Svrluga, He Robbed Banks and Went to Prison. His Time There Put Him on Track for a 
New Job: Georgetown Law Professor., WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/04/21/bank-robber-turned-georgetown-
law-professor-is-just-getting-started-on-his-goals [https://perma.cc/ACJ6-VFBG]. 
 2 Id. 
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truly remarkable feat of lawyering.3 At the age of thirty-three, Hopwood 
walked out of prison a free man. Although Hopwood’s first post-prison job 
was at a car wash, he was soon able to switch jobs and begin working at a 
family-run legal printing business.4 Shortly thereafter, the New York Times 
ran a profile on Hopwood, and Hopwood not only began to field speaking 
invitations, but also negotiated a book deal.5 When Hopwood decided to 
pursue a career as an attorney, he initially encountered some difficulty in 
earning admission to law school, but with time, he received both admission 
and a full scholarship from the University of Washington School of Law.6 
After graduating from law school, Hopwood obtained a prestigious federal 
clerkship as his first post-graduation job.7 Later, he received an employment 
offer at a law firm with a salary of $400,000 a year, followed by employment 
in a coveted tenure-track faculty position at Georgetown University Law 
Center.8 
Now compare Hopwood’s remarkable story9 and employment 
outcomes with those of Reginald “Dwayne” Betts, a black man who was 
convicted in 1996 for a carjacking he performed at the age of sixteen.10 
Following his conviction, Betts, who was once facing a possible life 
sentence, served eight years and three months in prison.11 After Betts was 
released from prison, he earned a bachelor of arts degree from the University 
of Maryland, a masters of fine arts (MFA) in writing from Warren Wilson 
College, a Radcliffe Fellowship at Harvard University, and a law degree 
from Yale Law School.12 Betts, a husband and father of two children, also 
published two critically acclaimed books of poetry and a memoir entitled A 
 
 3 See Adam Liptak, A Mediocre Criminal, but an Unmatched Jailhouse Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 
2010), https://nytimes.com/2010/02/09/us/09bar.html [https://perma.cc/JEH8-TAVY]. 
 4 See Svrluga, supra note 1. 
 5 See Author Q&A: Shon Hopwood, WASH. INDEP. (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonindependentreviewofbooks.com/features/author-qa-shon-hopwood 
[https://perma.cc/J37X-CSG7] (discussing Shon Hopwood’s first book, Law Man). 
 6 See Svrluga, supra note 1. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 The focus on Professor Hopwood’s story is not to begrudge him his success; rather, it is to highlight 
that formerly incarcerated people are capable of great success when they are truly given the opportunity 
to reach their full potential. We find his story to be incredibly inspiring. He is due the highest praise, and 
we believe his story is great evidence of why labor market discrimination against the formerly 
incarcerated is so deeply problematic. 
 10 Elisa Gonzalez, A Decade After Prison, a Poet Studies for the Bar Exam, NEW YORKER (June 30, 
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/a-decade-after-prison-a-poet-studies-for-the-bar-
exam [https://perma.cc/W6MC-4N5N]. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
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Question of Freedom.13 Yet in February of 2017, after Betts had passed the 
Connecticut State Bar examination and accepted a position as a public 
defender in New Haven, the Bar Examining Committee for Connecticut 
denied him admission to the Connecticut Bar.14 In its letter, the Bar 
Examining Committee explained its decision by stating that a “record 
manifesting a significant deficiency in the honesty, trustworthiness, 
diligence or reliability of an applicant may constitute a basis for denial of 
admission.”15 In the end, Betts was able to receive certification of good moral 
character from the Committee and earn admission to the Connecticut Bar, 
but only after nationwide protest and numerous newspaper articles critiquing 
the Committee’s initial decision to deny Betts admission.16 Professor James 
Forman of Yale Law School noted that it was sad that Betts, more than 
twenty years after he committed a carjacking as a teenager and after two 
decades of compiling an incredibly impressive academic and professional 
record, was still being told: “We are always going to judge you differently.”17 
In fact, Betts’s story reveals not only how he, a former felon, may forever be 
treated differently because of this status, but also how black former prisoners 
frequently receive different treatment than white former prisoners upon their 
release, even when they share similar credentials.18 Unlike Hopwood, who 
was given numerous prestigious opportunities after law school, Betts instead 
was initially cut off at the pass when the Connecticut Bar first denied him 
admission into the profession. Although the outcome for Betts ultimately 
turned out to be positive, the difficulties he faced in simply gaining 
admission to the Bar illustrate how the collateral consequences of criminal 
convictions may be enacted in racially disparate ways. 
As the Betts example shows, the formerly incarcerated, particularly 
those of color, are quite vulnerable to rampant labor market discrimination 
 
 13 Id. 
 14 See Bari Weiss, Admit This Ex-Con to the Connecticut Bar, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/opinion/admit-this-ex-con-to-the-connecticut-bar.html 
[https://perma.cc/2GSN-MVK7]. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See Vinny Vella, State Bar Committee Approves Jail-to-Yale Lawyer, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 
29, 2017), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-news-dwayne-betts-approved-20170929-
story.html [https://perma.cc/4T3E-VB8D] (noting that Betts’s case “drew national attention, including an 
editorial from The New York Times calling on the bar association to approve him”). Betts is now a student 
in the Ph.D. program at Yale Law School. YALE LAW SCH., Studying Law at Yale: Dwayne Betts, 
https://law.yale.edu/studying-law-yale/degree-programs/graduate-programs/phd-program/phd-
candidate-profiles/dwayne-betts [https://perma.cc/R7AF-3VMB]. 
 17 Weiss, supra note 14. 
 18 See infra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
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after their release from prison.19 Indeed, a 2015 survey of formerly 
incarcerated individuals revealed that 76% of the respondents rated their 
experience in finding employment as very difficult or nearly impossible due 
to their past criminal convictions.20 
This discrimination that the formerly incarcerated face in the labor 
market is extensive, occurring both as a result of governmental and private 
action. For instance, in many states and municipalities, the formerly 
incarcerated encounter significant difficulty in obtaining employment in 
licensed professions because government statutes either directly or indirectly 
prevent them from obtaining work licenses in a variety of fields, such as 
nursing, barbering, and education.21 The formerly incarcerated also face 
 
 19 See generally Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence Is a Life Sentence: Employment Discrimination 
Against Ex-Offenders, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 45, 46–47 (2015); Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment 
Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (noting that courts and legislatures discourage employers 
from hiring workers with criminal records and encourage employers to discipline workers for non-work-
related criminal misconduct, effectively rendering private employers a de facto branch of the criminal 
justice system); Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on Crime 
Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J. 
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3 (2013); Christopher Stafford, Note, Finding Work: How to Approach the 
Intersection of Prisoner Reentry, Employment, and Recidivism, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 261, 
269–70 (2006) (explaining how tort laws and pressure from private insurers discourage employers from 
hiring the formerly incarcerated); see also Stephenson v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 566, 569 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting how employers are discouraged from hiring the formerly incarcerated because 
of “potential negligent hiring liability,” “strong societal stigma,” and even insurance companies that 
refuse “to cover employees who are former felons”); JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL 
RECORD 275–300 (2015) (detailing how a criminal record can prevent the formerly incarcerated from 
finding employment). 
 20 ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Who Pays? The True Cost of Incarceration on Families 
(2015), http://ellabakercenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/who-pays.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6W4-
VDXC]. 
 21 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-101(1)(a) (West 2018) (forbidding persons convicted of 
a felony or other crimes involving moral turpitude from serving as peace officers, educators, positions 
involving direct contact with vulnerable persons, positions in public or private correctional facilities or 
juvenile facilities, various state offices, plus more); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-9-49(2) (2018) 
(allowing the state licensing board to deny a nursing license to any person “convicted of a felony”); see 
also Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 597 (2006) (noting that 
the formerly incarcerated “are routinely excluded from many employment opportunities that 
require professional licenses”). These statutes prevent the formerly incarcerated from receiving 
professional licenses either directly through explicit exclusion or indirectly through “moral character” 
clauses. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6905 (McKinney 2018) (noting that an applicant shall “be of good 
moral character as determined by the department” in order “[t]o qualify for a license as a registered 
professional nurse”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.  8, § 64.3 (2018) (“A limited permit to practice 
as a registered professional nurse or licensed practical nurse may be issued after the applicant has met 
requirements of age, moral character, education and proficiency examination . . . .”); see also Bruce E. 
May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-
Felon’s Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 193 (1995) (“In some states virtually the only 
‘profession’ open to an ex-felon is that of burglar; the ex-felon is barred from other activities because she 
or he is presumed to be a person of bad moral character, regardless of the nature of the crime or its 
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serious discrimination within the private employment market, as many 
employers use the results from applicants’ criminal background checks to 
deny them employment.22 Furthermore, even after some formerly 
incarcerated people are able to find employment and are performing their 
jobs well, employers may still terminate those individuals once the employer 
discovers their criminal history.23 
Not surprisingly, studies show that even after five years of release from 
prison, almost 67% of all formerly incarcerated individuals remain 
unemployed or underemployed.24 Other studies have shown that labor market 
discrimination is particularly pernicious for ex-offenders who are racial 
minorities, especially if they are black.25 For example, the research of 
sociologists Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Naomi Sugie reveals not only 
that black job applicants with criminal records are less likely to obtain a job 
callback interview than white job applicants with criminal records, but also 
that black job applicants without a criminal record are less likely to receive 
a callback interview than white job applicants with a criminal record.26 
 
relevance to the intended occupation.”). A number of real-life cases illustrate the hazards of state and 
municipal statutes that place barriers on the formerly incarcerated individual’s ability to obtain 
professional licenses. See, e.g., Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 453 (1954) (holding that a 
doctor’s state license to practice medicine could be suspended on the basis of a conviction without 
violating his due process rights because the state statute was “well within the degree of reasonableness 
required to constitute due process of law in a field so permeated with public responsibility as that of 
health”); Standow v. City of Spokane, 564 P.2d 1145, 1152–53 (Wash. 1977) (finding that the denial of 
a formerly incarcerated applicant’s request for a license to operate a vehicle for hire based on a city 
ordinance that permitted the denial of such license on the basis of his prior convictions was valid on the 
grounds that the applicant’s previous driving infractions and felony convictions were reasonably related 
to his ability to drive a motor vehicle for hire), overruled by State v. Smith, 610 P.2d 869 (Wash. 1980). 
 22 See Sandra J. Mullings, Employment of Ex-Offenders: The Time Has Come for a True 
Antidiscrimination Statute, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 261, 272 (2014) (pointing out survey results where 
73% and 88% of employers indicated that they conducted criminal background checks for all applicants); 
Jocelyn Simonson, Rethinking “Rational Discrimination” Against Ex-Offenders, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY 
L. & POL’Y 283, 284 (2006) (highlighting a “survey of employers in four major metropolitan areas” where 
“only 12.5% of employers said that they would definitely accept an application from an individual with 
a criminal record, and 25.9% said that they probably would”). 
 23 See, e.g., Cisco v. UPS, 476 A.2d 1340, 1343–44 (1984) (holding that criminal charges against an 
employee—even though the charges ultimately resulted in an acquittal—were sufficient grounds for 
termination and did not violate any public policy because the employer had a right to protect its reputation 
by discharging the individual). 
 24 ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20. 
 25 See, e.g., Devah Pager, Bruce Western & Naomi Sugie, Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to 
Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 195, 195 (2009); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 960 
(2003); Jordan Segall, Mass Incarceration, Ex-Felon Discrimination & Black Labor Market 
Disadvantage, 14 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 159, 160 (2011). 
 26 Pager, Western & Sugie, supra note 25, at 199–209; Pager, supra note 25, at 958. 
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The prospects for eliminating or even significantly reducing labor 
market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated are dim, both in the 
public and private realms. In the public realm, equal protection claims are 
unlikely to abrogate government statutes that prohibit the formerly 
incarcerated from obtaining the professional licenses required for certain 
jobs because any challenges to the use of a prisoner–nonprisoner 
classification in the statutes are likely to survive the low hurdle of rational 
basis review.27 Additionally, the Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey 
forecloses any avenue for addressing this labor market discrimination against 
formerly incarcerated individuals who are racial minorities.28 In McCleskey, 
the Court held that Georgia’s application of the death penalty did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause, despite its disparate effects based on the race of 
the defendant and the race of the victim.29 Additionally, the Court held that 
proof of intent to discriminate is necessary if plaintiffs wish to prevail on 
race-based equal protection claims, which means that any formerly 
incarcerated plaintiffs who wish to prove that professional license-restricting 
statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause must prove unlawful intent by 
the respective legislatures in passing such statutes.30 McCleskey, however, 
makes it clear that such formerly incarcerated plaintiffs would not be able to 
prove unlawful race discrimination in these cases because they could not 
show that the involved legislatures passed such statutes “in part ‘because of,’ 
not merely ‘in spite of,’ [their] adverse effects upon” Blacks.31 Furthermore, 
 
 27 See infra Part II. 
 28 Id. 
 29 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297–99 (1987). 
 30 See id. 
 31 See id. at 298. Throughout this Essay, we capitalize the words “Black” and “White” when we use 
them as nouns to describe a racialized group; however, we do not capitalize these terms when we use 
them as adjectives. Additionally, we find that “[i]t is more convenient to invoke the terminological 
differentiation between black and white than say, between African-American and Northern European-
American, which would be necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies.” Alex 
M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4. Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw, one of the founders of Critical Race 
Theory, has explained that “Black” deserves capitalization because “Blacks, like Asians [and] Latinos, . . . 
constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.” Kimberlé Williams 
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination 
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988). Also, we generally prefer to use the term “Blacks” to 
the term “African Americans” because “Blacks” is more inclusive. For example, while the term “Blacks” 
encompasses black permanent residents or other black noncitizens in the United States, the term “African 
Americans” includes only those who are formally Americans, whether by birth or naturalization. That 
said, given the historical nature of several parts of this Essay, and in light of the fact that a large influx of 
black immigrants did not occur in the United States until the 1960s and 1970s, we sometimes use the term 
“African American” where the term “Black” is not needed for inclusivity reasons. See Kevin R. Johnson, 
The End of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1392 
equal protection jurisprudence in general makes it clear that formerly 
incarcerated plaintiffs cannot establish that these license-restricting statutes 
are grounded in a racial classification.32 Even though African-Americans and 
Latinos are overrepresented in prisons in the United States33—and thus 
disproportionately affected by such state statutes—they would not be able to 
show that the felon or ex-offender “classification” in these statutes 
constitutes a racial classification.34 Indeed, courts would be certain to 
highlight that Whites are actually the numerical majority in the nation’s 
prisons, even though they are underrepresented in comparison to their 
representation in the national population.35 
In the private realm, the formerly incarcerated would face equally 
formidable obstacles in proving unlawful discrimination. After all, there is 
no federal statute that prohibits employers from discriminating against the 
formerly incarcerated in hiring or promotion.36 Although the “Ban the Box” 
movement is growing in the country, and a number of states have actually 
banned the boxes that ask about criminal history on applications, such 
actions reduce only the possibility that an employer will discriminate against 
the formerly incarcerated based on their former prisoner status; they do not 
make it unlawful for employers to actually discriminate against the formerly 
incarcerated on the basis of former prisoner status.37 The only hope that 
formerly incarcerated plaintiffs have for combating discrimination in the 
private labor market comes from a nonbinding policy statement by the Equal 
 
UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1484 (2002) (“The year 1965 thus marked the beginning of a much more diverse, 
far less European immigrant stream into this country.”). 
 32 Cf. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1303 (1995) 
(“The Court has defined ‘discriminatory purpose’ to mean, in race cases, out-and-out racial animus—an 
affirmative desire to hurt blacks.”). 
 33 See GLENN C. LOURY, RACE, INCARCERATION AND AMERICAN VALUES 6 (2008) (comparing the 
United States’ incarceration rate to that of other nations and detailing that the U.S. prison population is 
“vastly disproportionately black and brown”). 
 34 Cf. Sklansky, supra note 32, at 1304 (explaining that the race-based equal protection challenges 
to the crack–powder cocaine and essentially black–white disparity in sentencing repeatedly failed because 
“it is difficult if not impossible to prove, in part because hardly anyone admits to racism anymore, and in 
part because crack posed real dangers as well as symbolic ones, and much of what motivated Congress 
in 1986 appears to have been a well-founded fear of the drug’s actual effects, on blacks as well as on 
whites”). 
 35 See Statistics: Inmate Race, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (Feb. 24, 2018), 
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp [https://perma.cc/Y4B4-HVLQ] 
(indicating that Whites constitute 58.4% of all prisoners); Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 
2016), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045216 [https://perma.cc/KPH5-WH44] 
(indicating that Whites constitute 76.9% of the United States population). 
 36 See Mullings, supra note 22, at 272. 
 37 EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment 
Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, EEOC (Apr. 25, 2012), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/74J9-5EVV]. 
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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which advises that an 
employer’s use of criminal background checks can violate the law if it is 
used to intentionally discriminate against minorities or has a demonstrably 
adverse discriminatory impact on minorities in employment.38 In summary, 
litigation alone is unlikely to eliminate or even reduce labor market 
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated, including its disparate 
racial effects. 
Keeping in mind that litigation is inadequate39 for fully addressing the 
problem of labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated, 
this Essay explores and analyzes potential legislative and contractual means 
for removing the expansive barriers to labor market participation by ex-
offenders. First, as a means of addressing government-based discrimination, 
this Essay explores the potential effect that requiring racial impact 
statements—which mandate that legislators consider statistical analyses of 
the potential impact that legislation may have on racial and ethnic groups 
prior to passing any legislation—could have on employment discrimination 
against the formerly incarcerated. The Essay then moves on to consider a 
contractual solution that partially addresses discrimination by private firms, 
particularly those that rely on the labor of imprisoned individuals. 
Part I of this Essay describes two different forms of labor market 
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated: (1) government-based 
discrimination in the form of laws that prohibit issuing professional licenses 
to the formerly incarcerated and (2) private discrimination in the form of 
corporate employers who use criminal records to deny or terminate 
employment. It also explores the negative effects on individuals and 
communities that arise from labor market discrimination against the formerly 
incarcerated. Part II examines one potential solution to government-based 
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated in work law: requiring all 
legislative bodies to produce, examine, and consider racial impact statements 
before enacting any legislation that will affect the formerly incarcerated. In 
so doing, Part II analyzes the influence of racial impact statements in the few 
states that have implemented them. Part III then discusses contractual 
stipulation as another innovative solution for addressing discrimination by 
private corporations against the formerly incarcerated. Part III begins by 
examining the phenomenon of prison labor to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of this Essay’s proposed contractual solution. Recognizing 
that many individuals actually provide low-wage (in fact, nearly free) labor 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 Reva Siegel makes this a central point in her Essay. See Reva Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court 
Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—And Some 
Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1269 (2018). 
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for private corporations while they are in prison, this Part argues that the state 
penal institutions that lease prisoners to such corporations should push for 
contractual agreements that stipulate that corporations relying on prison 
labor must revoke any and all policies that bar employing the formerly 
incarcerated upon their release. In addition, Part III explicates how 
contractual stipulations may also provide for affirmative hiring policies for 
the formerly incarcerated. Finally, this Essay concludes by highlighting how 
failing to address continued labor market discrimination against the formerly 
incarcerated could render the formerly incarcerated a permanent economic 
underclass and undermine the most fundamental democratic notions of 
fairness and equality. 
I. LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE 
FORMERLY INCARCERATED 
The formerly incarcerated encounter numerous collateral consequences 
from their convictions, including loss of voting rights, restricted access to 
housing, and limited employment opportunities.40 A collateral legal 
consequence of criminal conviction is defined as a legal “penalty, disability, 
or disadvantage, however denominated, imposed on an individual as a result 
of the individual’s conviction of an offense [that] applies by operation of law 
whether or not the penalty, disability, or disadvantage is included in the 
judgment or sentence.”41 The collateral legal consequences of criminal 
convictions have also been referred to as “punishment that is accomplished 
through the diminution of the rights and privileges of citizenship and legal 
 
 40 See Steven D. Bell, The Long Shadow: Decreasing Barriers to Employment, Housing, and Civic 
Participation for People with Criminal Records Will Improve Public Safety and Strengthen the Economy, 
42 W. ST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014). 
 41 See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT §§ 2(1), 5 (2010), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_final_10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GSJ7-KHJC]. In July of 2009, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (NCCUSL) approved for the first time model legislation—the Uniform Collateral 
Consequences of Conviction Act (UCCCA)—designed to facilitate offender reentry throughout the 
United States. A revised Act was approved in July 2010 and published on January 6, 2011. Although such 
models of uniform legislation do not carry the force of law because the NCCUSL is an advisory 
organization only, they still hold meaningful authority. After all, uniform acts approved by the NCCUSL 
have been, and continue to be, a factor in shaping the development of law across the United States. The 
newly approved UCCCA has been enacted in North Carolina and has been introduced in Connecticut, 
Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, and Vermont. See, e.g., S.B. 1063, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Conn. 2013); S.B. 292, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2017); see also UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Collateral 
Consequences of Conviction Act (2010), 
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Collateral%20Consequences%20of%20Conviction%20Act 
[https:perma.cc/54U2-Y7LH]. 
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residency in the United States.”42 Although the problems associated with the 
collateral consequences of conviction43 are legion and touch upon every 
aspect of life, this Part focuses solely on the collateral consequences of 
conviction on employment, including exclusion from the labor market as a 
result of intersectional discrimination on the basis of race and criminal 
status.44 Specifically, this Part details the forms of discrimination faced by 
the formerly incarcerated in the public and private labor market, as well as 
the consequences of such discrimination for the formerly incarcerated, their 
families, and society in general. Section I.A. begins by describing state-
sanctioned discrimination against the formerly incarcerated through 
restrictions or prohibitions in issuing professional licenses to former 
prisoners. Section I.B then details how private corporations discriminate 
against the formerly incarcerated. Finally, Section I.C explains why 
combating labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated is 
critical by detailing the harms of such discrimination, not only for formerly 
incarcerated individuals, but also for their families and greater society. 
A. Government Discrimination: Professional Licensing Laws 
As scholars like Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Becky Pettit have 
long asserted, incarceration—or more accurately, the general stigma that 
attaches to incarceration—results in poor employment outcomes.45 Indeed, 
Western and Pettit’s analysis of data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth revealed that “serving time in prison was associated with a 40 
 
 42 See Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 15–16 (Marc Mauer & 
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). 
 43 Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race 
and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 461 (2010). As one legal scholar has noted, “the problem of 
postconviction collateral consequences is rapidly becoming more severe for three interrelated reasons. 
First, collateral consequences have increased in number, scope, and severity since the 1980s. Second, 
record numbers of individuals are now exiting U.S. correctional facilities. Finally, collateral 
consequences hinder reentry and exacerbate the risks of recidivism; in fact, most individuals will be 
rearrested within three years of release.” Id. 
 44 See Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139 DAEDALUS 8, 13 
(2010). 
 45 See id. at 13–14 (detailing how incarceration limits work and economic opportunities). Cf. 
Catherine London, Racial Impact Statements: A Proactive Approach to Addressing Racial Disparities in 
Prison Populations, 29 LAW & INEQ. 211, 222–23 (2011) (noting how the “stigma of a felony conviction 
follows prisoners long after release and imposes an enormous burden on minority populations”). See 
generally Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 617 
(discussing the legal implications of the author’s audit study of employment prospects for formerly 
incarcerated men); Pager, supra note 25 (conducting an audit study by using male job applicants with 
criminal records and a control group and finding that those with criminal records were least likely to get 
callbacks and, further, that this effect was shaped by the race of the applicant, with black males with 
criminal records being the least likely to get a callback).  
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percent reduction in earnings and with reduced job tenure, reduced hourly 
wages, and higher unemployment.”46 
One of the reasons why the formerly incarcerated suffer reduced 
employment opportunities in the labor market is legislation—at both the state 
and local government level—that either outright prohibits issuing them 
professional licenses or provides the grounds for licensing boards to unfairly 
rely on stereotypes and biases against ex-offenders to deny the formerly 
incarcerated professional licenses. Even in the 1970s, before the 
phenomenon of mass incarceration emerged, there were “1,948 separate 
statutory provisions that affect[ed] the licensing of persons with an arrest or 
conviction record.”47 
Although a substantial number of states now have laws that prohibit 
licensing boards from denying the formerly incarcerated professional 
licenses based on past convictions that bear no relation to the work at issue,48 
many other states have maintained statutes that enable licensing boards to 
exclude the formerly incarcerated from work in certain fields simply because 
of a past felony conviction, even if that past conviction does not relate to the 
work at issue.49 For instance, in South Dakota, nursing licensing boards may 
deny a license to any person with a felony conviction.50 Indeed, as one 
scholar noted, “laws regulating public-employment hiring or licensing” bar 
ex-felons from obtaining licenses in at least 800 “discrete occupations.”51 
More so, courts have consistently upheld the application of such 
license-restricting statutes to former prisoners.52 For example, in Heller v. 
Ross, a federal district court upheld a licensing board’s decision to deny the 
plaintiff an insurance provider license based on a provision excluding all 
persons with felony convictions from obtaining such a license.53 In so doing, 
the court reasoned that the challenged provision survived constitutional 
 
 46 Western & Pettit, supra note 44, at 13. 
 47 May, supra note 21, at 193. 
 48 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(15) (McKinney 2018); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 
2018). 
 49 May, supra note 21, at 193. 
 50 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-9-49(2) (2018). 
 51 Segall, supra note 25, at 172. 
 52 See, e.g., Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (holding that a doctor’s state license to 
practice medicine could be suspended on the basis of a conviction); Heller v. Ross, 682 F. Supp. 2d 797 
(E.D. Mich. 2010); Acosta v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 946 N.E.2d 731, 732–33 (N.Y. 2011) (holding that 
there are two significant exceptions to the state’s prohibition that employers may not deny licenses “by 
reason of [an] individual’s having been previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses”; 
specifically, the exceptions might apply if (1) “there is a direct relationship between one or more of the 
previous criminal offenses and the specific license” or if (2) granting the license “would involve an 
unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public”). 
 53 682 F. Supp. 2d at 807. 
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scrutiny because “it applies only to would-be resident producers within the 
insurance industry; that is, it ‘only restricts felons from receiving one type of 
license,’” rather than restricting them from all licenses.54 
In addition to blanket statutory exclusions from certain jobs, “moral 
character” provisions also provide a means for denying the formerly 
incarcerated certain professional licenses and excluding them from 
employment in those fields.55 For instance, in Wombles v. City of Mount 
Washington, a federal district court upheld the denial of a business license to 
the plaintiff, noting that the challenged town ordinance “only restrict[ed] the 
granting of licenses based on . . . crimes of moral turpitude,” even though the 
ordinance left the term “moral turpitude” undefined.56 
B. Private Employers: Reliance on Criminal Records in Hiring and Firing 
In addition to labor market discrimination through license-restricting 
statutes, research shows that private employers often use criminal records as 
a reason for denying the formerly incarcerated employment or for 
terminating them thereafter.57 Indeed, one audit study by Devah Pager 
revealed that having a criminal record alone drastically reduced the chance 
of receiving a callback from an employer.58 Specifically, the study showed 
that, regardless of the race of the offenders, criminal records decreased a 
formerly incarcerated applicant’s likelihood of getting a callback by at least 
50%.59 
Pager’s research further revealed that private labor market 
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated is much more severe for 
Blacks than it is for Whites.60 For instance, Pager found that “even whites 
with criminal records received more favorable treatment (17%) than blacks 
without criminal records (14%)” when both groups were considered for 
callback interviews.61 While the ratio of callbacks for white job applicants 
without criminal records to white job applicants with criminal records was 
two-to-one—with 34% of whites without a criminal record obtaining 
callback interviews, compared with 17% of those with criminal records—the 
 
 54 Id. at 805 (quoting Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040, 1043 (6th Cir. 1984)). 
 55 May, supra note 21, at 193. 
 56 No. 3:15-CV-00856-TBR, 2017 WL 927238, at *6–7 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 8, 2017). 
 57 See, e.g., Pager, supra note 25 at 956–59. 
 58 Id. at 959. 
 59 Id. at 957–59. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 958. 
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comparable ratio for black job applicants was three-to-one, making the effect 
of a criminal record for Blacks 40% larger than it was for Whites.62 
Additionally, it is important to note that the detrimental impact of a 
criminal record attaches even when a defendant has been acquitted of 
charges. In fact, Cisco v. UPS illustrates this reality. In Cisco, the Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania held that, absent any applicable statute, criminal 
charges against an employee were sufficient grounds for termination (and a 
refusal to rehire), even when the employee had ultimately been acquitted of 
the charges.63 The court reasoned that the employer had not violated any 
public policy because the “employer was protecting its reputation by 
discharging” the individual.64 The court explained: 
Thus, marriages crumble when one is adjudged guilty without ever being 
considered innocent and jobs are lost when the employer, for a legitimate 
business reason, cannot risk even someone under suspicion of having 
committed theft and trespass when the nature of its business is to enter onto the 
premises of others and to deliver parcels which belong to them.65 
In essence, even as the court recognized the illogic and injustice of these 
discriminatory practices by a private employer, plus their substantial impact 
on individuals, families, and communities, it still chose to affirm an 
employer’s right to engage in these damaging actions. 
C. The Importance of Addressing the Effects of Public and Private Labor 
Market Discrimination Against the Formerly Incarcerated 
Developing new approaches for addressing labor market discrimination 
against the formerly incarcerated is crucial because the consequences of this 
pervasive discrimination are severe, not only for formerly incarcerated 
individuals, but also for society more broadly. Recent studies examined the 
unemployment rate for formerly incarcerated adults and found that, of those 
interviewed one to three months after release, only 10% were employed full-
time, and only 44% of those interviewed eight months after release said they 
had worked at least one week since their release.66 Although 60% of all ex-
prisoners are rearrested within three years, ex-prisoners who have stable 
employment are much less likely to recidivate and more likely to reintegrate 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 476 A.2d 1340, 1344 (1984). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 SHAWN BUSHWAY ET AL., BARRIERS TO REENTRY? THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED 
PRISONERS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 89 (2007) (examining the labor market for released prisoners 
in the post-industrial United States through employer surveys, interviews with former prisoners, and state 
data on prison employment programs and post-incarceration outcomes). 
112:1385 (2018) Combating Discrimination 
1399 
into society than those without steady employment or with no employment 
at all.67 After all, steady jobs make it more likely that an ex-prisoner will be 
able to financially support himself or his family.68 
Additionally, labor market discrimination against the formerly 
incarcerated negatively contributes to the national unemployment rate.69 As 
Cherrie Bucknor and Alan Barber highlighted in a 2016 Center for Economic 
and Policy Research paper, formerly incarcerated men contribute 1.6 to 1.8 
percentage points to the national male unemployment rate.70 Additionally, 
overall employment rates are .09 to 1 percentage points lower as a result of 
the discrimination faced by the large population of former prisoners and 
people with felony convictions; this reduction in employment equals a 
reduction of nearly two million workers.71 If one includes the currently 
incarcerated in these estimates, the impact is even greater, particularly for 
uneducated men of color.72 For example, in 2008, data showed that 
approximately 60% of black men without a high school education were 
unemployed; however, when black male high school dropouts who were 
incarcerated were included, the percentage of unemployed men in that group 
increased to approximately 75%.73 In other words, as Western and Pettit 
proclaimed, “by 2008 these men were more likely to be locked up than 
employed.”74 
Furthermore, as Western and Pettit highlighted in their National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth analysis, the inequities that stem from 
incarceration are intergenerational. They not only negatively affect the 
incarcerated and the formerly incarcerated, they also harm their families, 
 
 67 See Pinard, supra note 43; see also Jennifer Lundquist, Devah Pager & Eiko Strader, Does a 
Criminal Past Predict Worker Performance? Evidence from One of America’s Largest Employers, 
96 SOC. FORCES 1039, 1039 (2018). 
 68 DIANA BRAZZELL ET AL., FROM THE CLASSROOM TO THE COMMUNITY: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF 
EDUCATION DURING INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 17 (July 31, 2009), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411963_classroom_community.pdf [https://perma.cc/33K9-
TN79]; see also BUSHWAY ET AL., supra note 66. 
 69 Note that the national unemployment rate shows the percentage of the labor force that is without 
a job. It defines unemployed people as those who are willing and able to work, and who have actively 
sought work within the past four weeks. As the rate increases, it is understood that more Americans are 
having trouble finding stable employment. See Unemployment Rate, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unemploymentrate.asp [https://perma.cc/C86X-2VAC]. 
 70 CHERRIE BUCKNOR & ALAN BARBER, THE PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC COSTS OF BARRIERS TO 
EMPLOYMENT FOR FORMER PRISONERS AND PEOPLE CONVICTED OF FELONIES 1 (2016), 
http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/employment-prisoners-felonies-2016-06.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M4PZ-QKXD]. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Western & Pettit, supra note 44, at 12. 
 73 Id. at 12–13. 
 74 Id. at 12. 
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including their partners, children, grandchildren, and other descendants.75 
Finally, labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated harms 
society’s sense of fairness. No studies support the idea that formerly 
incarcerated individuals are poor workers or pose a greater security risk than 
workers who have not been convicted of a crime. Instead, as the work of 
sociologist Devah Pager shows, the formerly incarcerated pose no higher 
level of risk than their coworkers without criminal records.76 In a compelling 
case study, Jennifer Lundquist, Devah Pager, and Eiko Strader focused on 
the largest employer in the United States: the U.S. military. In the absence 
of a mandatory draft, the military relies on recruiting individuals (including 
those with felonies) to serve.77 The authors found that, even in the military, 
which mandates even stricter rules for conduct than civilian workplaces, 
workers with felony-level criminal records are no more likely to be 
discharged for the negative reasons employers assume (such as misconduct 
or poor work performance) than those with no criminal record.78 
Furthermore, they found that there was no evidence that individuals with 
serious criminal records showed elevated levels of early termination—a key 
finding, since data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that “the risk 
of recidivism falls steadily with time since arrest, with nearly 60 percent of 
recidivism occurring within the first year.”79 All in all, Lundquist et al.’s 
research seems to indicate that there is no greater risk in employing the 
formerly incarcerated than the never incarcerated, and that the risk is 
particularly lower for formerly incarcerated individuals who have been out 
of prison for some time.80 
In all, reducing and ultimately eliminating labor market discrimination 
against the formerly incarcerated is crucial because unemployment makes 
successful reentry much more difficult for them. Studies have repeatedly 
demonstrated that employment serves to reduce recidivism among the 
 
 75 Id. at 8; see also London, supra note 45, at 222–23 (“High incarceration rates in some areas, 
particularly low-income African American neighborhoods, have considerable consequences for families 
and communities. High recidivism rates further disrupt families, resulting in a dangerous pattern of 
imprisonment. Harsh sentencing policies and lack of reentry support ‘harm children and contribute to the 
intergenerational transmission of offending.’ Children face a host of challenges stemming from parental 
imprisonment.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 76 Lundquist, Pager & Strader, supra note 67, at 1050. 
 77 Id. at 1040. 
 78 Id. at 1050. 
 79 Id. at 1041. 
 80 We understand that some might argue that the U.S. military, with its strict routines, protocols, and 
supervision, is too specialized an employer to be generalizable as a case study, and in that vein we urge 
private employers to allow the study of their formerly incarcerated employees for the benefit of societal 
edification. 
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formerly incarcerated.81 Addressing discrimination must also include 
addressing wages because levels of compensation also influence reentry 
outcomes, as those making higher wages are less likely to recidivate.82 
The next two Parts of this Essay offer a couple of suggestions for 
combating both public and private market discrimination against the 
formerly incarcerated. Part II of this Essay proposes a means by which 
legislatures can help to reduce state-sanctioned discrimination against the 
formerly incarcerated in the workplace, and Part III turns to a potential 
contractual remedy for some of the discrimination that the formerly 
incarcerated face in the private labor market. 
II. GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION: TURNING TO LEGISLATURES 
 INSTEAD OF LITIGATION 
As noted earlier, litigation, particularly equal protection litigation, is 
unlikely to be an effective means for combating state-sanctioned labor 
market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated through license-
restricting statutes for a variety of reasons. Those reasons include the low 
level of scrutiny—rational basis review—that would be applied to claims 
concerning a prisoner/non-prisoner classification and McCleskey’s 
requirement that plaintiffs in race-based equal protection lawsuits prove a 
legislature’s intent to pass the challenged statute “‘because of,’ not merely 
‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon” a racial group.83 In light of the limited 
impact that litigation is likely to have on reducing state-sanctioned 
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated in the workplace, this Part 
proposes a means by which state legislatures can help to lessen the impact of 
this discrimination—in this instance, the discrimination that occurs through 
state statutes that prohibit licensing entities from granting certain 
professional licenses to the formerly incarcerated. Specifically, this Part of 
the Essay proposes that all legislative bodies should adopt a requirement for 
 
 81 See MILES HARER, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, 
RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987, at 4–5 (1994), 
https://www.bop.gov/resources/research_projects/published_reports/recidivism/oreprrecid87.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A55D-FVH8]; Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, A Life-Course Theory of Cumulative 
Disadvantage and the Stability of Delinquency, in ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 21 (Terence 
P. Thornberry ed., 1997), https://scholar.harvard.edu/sampson/files/1997_act_laub.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JEU3-CZGC]; Christopher Uggen, Work as a Turning Point in the Life Course of 
Criminals: A Duration Model of Age, Employment, and Recidivism, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 529 (2000), 
http://users.soc.umn.edu/~uggen/Uggen_asr_00.pdf [https://perma.cc/37CF-LZNE]. 
 82 Christy Visher et al., Employment After Prison: A Longitudinal Study of Releasees in Three States, 
URBAN INST. JUST. POL’Y CTR. (Oct. 1, 2008), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32106/411778-Employment-after-Prison-A-
Longitudinal-Study-of-Releasees-in-Three-States.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9PG-GGPB]. 
 83 See supra notes 29–39 and accompanying text. 
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“racial impact statements,” which force legislators to engage in a statistical 
analysis about the disproportionate impact that any proposed legislation may 
have on racial and ethnic minorities before they pass the proposed 
legislation.84 
The call for racial impact statements arose from a recognition of the 
devastating impact that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which provided 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes, and other “War on Drugs” 
policies were having on communities of color, especially the black 
community.85 That recognition involved not only an acknowledgment of 
mass incarceration as a pernicious social problem in the United States,86 but 
also an understanding of mass incarceration as a social issue that has 
uniquely plagued black and brown communities.87 
 
 84 See generally London, supra note 45, at 212 (defining “racial impact statement [as] a predictive 
report summarizing the effects that legislation may have on minority groups”). 
 85 See id. at 211 (discussing how the Act’s proposed sentences for crack-cocaine crimes had a 
damaging effect on black communities); see also DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES 
RACE MATTER? THE TRANSITION TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1 (1993) (explaining that sentencing 
during the “War on Drugs” was disproportionately slanted toward longer sentences for Blacks than 
Whites, even for similar crimes); Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug and 
Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1, 20 (2008) (arguing that 
disproportionate minority confinement results from several factors, including sentencing policies that 
have a disparate impact on racial minorities). 
 86 See Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law 
of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 307 (2009) (“United States imprisonment rates are 
now almost five times higher than the historical norm prevailing throughout most of the twentieth century, 
and they are three to five times higher than in other Western democracies.”); see also Adam Liptak, 
Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1 (“The United States has 
less than 5 percent of the world’s population. But it has almost a quarter of the world’s prisoners.”). 
Recent studies show that nearly one in three Americans have been arrested by the time they are twenty-
three years old and that, on any given day, one in every 100 adults is imprisoned. See Amy L. Solomon, 
In Search of a Job: Criminal Records as Barriers to Employment, NAT’L INST. JUST. (2012), 
http://www.nij.gov/journals/270/criminal-records.htm [https://perma.cc/V2LV-9SB7]. 
 87 See Jessica Erickson, Comment, Racial Impact Statements: Considering the Consequences of 
Racial Disproportionalities in the Criminal Justice System, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2014) 
(asserting that “African Americans and Latinos account for fifty-eight percent of the United States prison 
population—nearly twice their accumulated representation in the general population of thirty percent”); 
see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 4 (2010) (“[M]ass incarceration in the United States had, in fact, emerged as a 
stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social control that functions in a 
manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow.”); PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 36–37 (2009) (examining the racially disparate effects of mass incarceration); Jonathan Simon, 
A Radical Need for Criminology, 40 SOC. JUST. 9, 9 (2014) (discussing “the damage done to future 
generations from incarcerating an unprecedented number of Americans, especially from communities 
already disadvantaged by economic marginalization and legacies of racial discrimination”); MaryBeth 
Lipp, A New Perspective on the “War on Drugs”: Comparing the Consequences of Sentencing Policies 
in the United States and England, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 979, 1022 (2004) (explaining that the African-
American population has been disproportionately harmed by the War on Drugs because “nearly one-tenth 
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As a result, racial impact statement requirements were designed to force 
lawmakers to consider the inequalities and complexities related to the 
overrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities in U.S. prisons when they 
adopted or amended any legislation.88 In this way, legislators would be 
pushed to consider the negative consequences that their proposed statutes 
and policies might have on people of color within the criminal justice system 
and in relation to the criminal justice system and, more so, would be pushed 
to “consider alternative approaches that [could avoid] exacerbat[ing] 
existing racial disparities.”89 The State of Minnesota’s own racial impact 
statement requirement makes this purpose very clear. That statement 
provides in relevant part: 
[The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission] seeks to enrich the 
discussion on how minorities in Minnesota are affected by changes in 
sentencing policy. If a significant racial disparity can be predicted before a bill 
is passed, it may be possible to consider alternatives that enhance public safety 
 
of black males in their twenties already live in prison, and almost one out of three black males currently 
remains under criminal justice control”); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass 
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1279 (2004) (detailing the 
pernicious effects of the War on Drugs on African-American communities); Bryan A. Stevenson, 
Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 
41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 343 (2006) (documenting that mass incarceration has disrupted the 
administration of the criminal justice system); Angela Davis, Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison 
Industrial Complex, COLORLINES (Sept. 10, 1998), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/masked-racism-
reflections-prison-industrial-complex [https://perma.cc/VF6P-WH5A] (arguing that mass incarceration, 
because of its disproportionate impact on black and Latino males in the United States, has a “strategic 
dependence on racist structures and ideologies”); cf. Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony 
Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 351–52 (2012) 
(asserting that criminal justice debt can serve as an “insurmountable obstacle” to the resumption of voting 
rights and broader participation in society); Nekima Levy-Pounds, Beaten by the System and Down for 
the Count: Why Poor Women of Color and Children Don’t Stand a Chance Against U.S. Drug-Sentencing 
Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 462, 494 (2006) (arguing that poor women of color and their children are 
adversely affected by current drug sentencing policies because such policies are designed to relegate 
women of color and their children to what has been referred to as the perpetual “‘pink hole’ [that] engulfs 
the most vulnerable members of society”). 
 88 See Erickson, supra note 87, at 1426. The American Law Institute was among the first entities to 
propose the use of racial impact statements to address racial disparities in the criminal justice system. See 
London, supra note 45, at 31 (referencing MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(e) (Prelim. Draft 
No. 1, 2002)). In so doing, they drafted a Model Penal Code (MPC) provision that required sentencing 
commissions to generate “Demographic Impact Statements” that offered predictions of what the gender, 
racial, and ethnic patterns in sentencing would be under the legislation in question. MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING § 6A.07 (2007). The revised MPC envisions a “correctional-population forecasting model” 
applicable to existing legislation as well as to newly introduced bills and amendments. Id. 
 89 See London, supra note 45, at 227; see also Kevin R. Reitz, Demographic Impact Statements, 
O’Connor’s Warning, and the Mysteries of Prison Release: Topics from a Sentencing Reform Agenda, 
61 FLA. L. REV. 683, 691–92 (2009). The projections in racial impact statements are designed to engage 
lawmakers in discussions concerning the potential impact of proposed legislation, thereby ensuring 
legislative accountability. Id. 
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without creating additional disparity in Minnesota’s criminal justice 
system. . . . [T]he agency does not intend to comment on whether or not a 
particular bill should be enacted. Rather, it is setting out facts that may be useful 
to the Legislature, whose members frequently express concerns about the 
disparity between the number of minorities in our population and the number in 
our prisons.90 
At the very least, racial impact statement requirements were expected 
to push legislators to justify any enacted laws or policies that worked to 
create, maintain, or increase racial and ethnic disparities by forcing the 
legislators to explain why they had chosen to pass the statutes despite their 
projected racially disparate effects. In this sense, racial impact statement 
requirements have the potential to provide a means by which plaintiffs can 
prove that any statute challenged in equal protection litigation was enacted 
“in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon” a 
racial group.91 
Several states have passed legislation that requires the consideration of 
racial impact statements in their legislative processes.92 Indeed, Connecticut, 
Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Oregon have each passed racial impact 
legislation, and many other states, including Arkansas, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Texas, and Wisconsin, have considered passing racial impact statement 
legislation.93 For instance, since 2008, Iowa has mandated, through the 
Minority Impact Statement Bill, that its state legislative services agency not 
only prepare a correctional impact statement for proposed policy changes 
related to the criminal justice system, but also conduct a racial impact 
analysis that examines the impact of sentencing or parole changes on racial 
and ethnic minorities.94 Iowa enacted these requirements in response to a 
 
 90 See London, supra note 45, at 228 (emphasis added) (citing MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
COMM’N, RACIAL IMPACT FOR H.F. 3175: ROBBERY – INCREASED PENALTIES (Feb. 29, 2008)). 
 91 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987). 
 92 See Erickson, supra note 87, at 1426–27; see also Nicole D. Porter, Racial Impact Statements, 
SENT’G PROJECT (2014), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-impact-statements 
[https://perma.cc/SV6M-3E24] (stating that Iowa, Connecticut, Oregon, and Minnesota all adopted racial 
impact statement preparation and consideration policies as of 2014, and that other states have started to 
introduce racial impact statement legislation). 
 93 See Erickson, supra note 87, at 1426–27 (noting that Iowa, Oregon, and Connecticut have passed 
racial impact statement legislation and that “[s]even other states have attempted but failed to pass” such 
legislation); see also Porter, supra note 92 (stating that Minnesota adopted a racial impact statement 
requirement); Corinne Ramey, State to Assess Racial Impact in Crime-Law Changes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
17, 2018, at A10B (indicating that New Jersey now requires “an analysis of [criminal justice laws’] impact 
on racial and ethnic minorities, making the state among only a handful in the nation to do so”). 
 94 See IOWA IMPACT OF LEGISLATION AND STATE GRANTS ON MINORITIES — STATEMENTS, CH. 
1095 H.F. 2393, § 2.56 (2008). In so doing, the Legislative Services Agency “may request the cooperation 
of any state department or agency or political subdivision in preparing [a statement].” IOWA CODE § 2.56 
(2018). 
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study indicating that Iowa’s prisons had the highest racial disparities in the 
nation with almost fourteen black prisoners for every one white prisoner.95 
Indeed, Chet Culver, then Iowa’s governor, stated that the requirement 
would allow members of the General Assembly and executive branch to 
consider legislation with a “better understanding of the potential effects, both 
positive and negative, on Iowa’s minority communities.”96 Since then, 
Iowa’s Minority Impact Statement Bill has resulted in ten minority impact 
statements; these statements have shown great promise for setting a context 
in which racial disparities can be reduced in Iowa’s criminal justice system.97 
For example, in one instance, Iowa lawmakers declined passing legislation 
after a racial impact statement revealed that the proposed statute “would 
increase penalties for cocaine offenses after a racial-impact statement 
showed the policy would disproportionately affect blacks.”98 
Much like Iowa, Oregon adopted a racial impact statement requirement 
in 2013 because of racial disproportionality in its prison system and its child 
welfare system.99 Though not as stark as the disparities in Iowa, statistics in 
Oregon also exposed an overrepresentation of Blacks in its criminal justice 
system, with Blacks making up only 2% of the state population but 9% of 
the Oregon prison population.100 Similarly, a letter from Democratic State 
Representative Joseph Gallegos, the sponsor of Oregon’s racial impact 
statement bill, detailed racial disparities within Oregon’s child welfare 
system, with both black and American Indian children each making up nearly 
9% of the children in the child welfare system despite each comprising less 
than 2% of all children in Oregon.101 Oregon’s racial impact statement 
legislation requires the state sentencing commission or a legislative analyst 
to produce a statistical report if one member of each party requests such a 
 
 95 See Farai Chideya, Iowa Considering Racial Impact in Sentencing Laws, NPR (May 1, 2008, 9:00 
AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90102924 [https://perma.cc/3LZ4-EQZX] 
(reporting that while 2% of Iowa’s population is black, 24% of the state’s prison population is black). 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Ramey, supra note 93. In 2009 alone, Iowa issued ten minority impact statements during its 
state legislative session. London, supra note 45, at 229 (citing an e-mail from Beth Lenstra, Senior 
Analyst, Iowa Legislative Services Agency, to the author in October 2009). 
 98 Ramey, supra note 93. 
 99 Maggie Clark, Should More States Require Racial Impact Statements for New Laws?, PEW 
CHARITABLE TR. (July 30, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/07/30/should-more-states-require-racial-impact-statements-for-new-laws 
[https://perma.cc/EE3M-9LGR]. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. (providing a link to the letter, 
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2013R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/22286 
[https://perma.cc/P6DL-4UUA]). 
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report.102 It also requires the report to “show how [the] proposed law could 
have consequences for sentencing, probation or parole policies affecting 
minorities disproportionately . . . .”103 Although Oregon’s bill, unlike Iowa’s, 
is relatively new and has not been utilized as much, lawmakers like 
Representative Gallegos believe that it will push legislators to use state 
resources more efficiently and effectively.104 
Because Blacks and Latinos are overrepresented in the prison 
population in essentially every state in the United States, and because racial 
impact statement requirements in each state would require legislators to 
explicitly confront and interrogate the racial implications of professional 
license-restricting statutes before they were either created or amended, racial 
impact statements, which are “modeled on fiscal and environmental impact 
statements,”105 have a very strong potential for helping to reduce labor market 
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated across the nation. They have 
the potential for doing so because they help to strip legislators of any claims 
of ignorance or lack of knowledge about the potentially dangerous outcomes 
of any enacted legislation on communities of color. More importantly, racial 
impact statement requirements may make social science knowledge of 
racially disparate effects—knowledge that the McCleskey Court found 
insufficient to prove intent to discriminate—a potential consideration for 
legislative bodies and, ultimately, courts in any future equal protection 
litigation. 
III. A CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION TO PRIVATE EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST THE FORMERLY INCARCERATED 
Although racial impact statement requirements have the potential for 
effectively combating the harmful effects of professional license-restricting 
statutes on the formerly incarcerated, additional action is needed to address 
private labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated. The 
use of low-paid prison labor by private corporations remains a widespread 
practice that calls into question the policies of those same corporations that 
prohibit employing the formerly incarcerated. In this Part, the Essay traces 
the rise of prison labor as a relic of slavery, and makes the argument that, to 
finally jettison prison labor practices as a particular remnant of racial slavery 
in the United States, prison labor cannot exist alongside private firm policies 
that compound the exclusion of the formerly incarcerated from the labor 
market. 
 
 102 Clark, supra note 99. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 London, supra note 45, at 227. 
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While the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution has been 
lauded by history books and legal scholars for abolishing slavery, the 
Amendment has also been read to uphold labor practices that in reality could 
amount to slavery for a certain segment of the American population—that is, 
those convicted of a crime.106 The Thirteenth Amendment reads: “Neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof 
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, 
or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”107 Consider the case of Morales v. 
Schmidt, where the Seventh Circuit noted that “[t]he Thirteenth Amendment, 
if read literally, suggests that the States may treat their prisoners as 
slaves . . . .”108 Indeed, this literal interpretation is evident in an earlier case, 
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, where the Virginia Supreme Court observed that a 
prisoner, 
during his term of service in the penitentiary, [] is in a state of penal servitude 
to the State. He has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, 
but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to 
him. He is for the time being the slave of the State.109 
Some legal scholars have challenged this interpretation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment as denying any labor protection for all prisoners.110 
As Raja Raghunath explained, 
[r]eading the Thirteenth Amendment in a manner that is consistent with the 
weight of constitutional jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment and the 
Fifth Amendment reveals that only those inmates who are forced to work 
because they have been so sentenced should be exempted from the general ban 
on involuntary servitude.111 
 
 106 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241–42 (1911). 
 107 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 108 489 F.2d 1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1973), on reh’g, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974). 
 109 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871) (emphasis added). 
 110 See, e.g., Andrea C. Armstrong, Slavery Revisited in Penal Plantation Labor, 35 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 869, 872 (2012) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment allows for forced inmate labor only when 
the labor approximates the conditions of involuntary servitude, rather than slavery); Mary Rose 
Whitehouse, Modern Prison Labor: A Reemergence of Convict Leasing Under the Guise of Rehabilitation 
and Private Enterprises, 18 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 89, 106–07 (2017) (explaining four primary factors courts 
use to determine the economic reality of prison labor and thus prisoners’ eligibility for labor protections: 
“(1) [w]hether the alleged employer ha[s] the power to hire and fire the employees; (2) [w]hether the 
alleged employer supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (3) 
[w]hether the alleged employer determined the rate and method of payment; and (4) [w]hether the alleged 
employer maintained employment records”). 
 111 Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What Prevents the Application of the 
Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 395, 398 (2009) (emphasis in original). 
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The legal rationale behind this assertion is that constitutional protections 
against unfair labor practices are “denied to prisoners compelled to work [as 
part of their penal punishment] because the beneficial value of the prisoners’ 
labor was owned by the prison; i.e., they were enslaved by the state.”112 As 
Raghunath further explicated, even if a “plain reading of the Thirteenth 
Amendment would allow for the imposition of either involuntary servitude 
or slavery as punishment for crime,” societal changes may indicate a 
different direction; given changing attitudes towards punishment and the fact 
that “we no longer view the infliction of pain—or rather, too much pain—as 
an acceptable form of punishment . . . presumably sentencing convicted 
criminals to slave-like conditions (or granting prison wardens the discretion 
to treat them as such) is not an acceptable policy option.”113 
 Although there might seem to be a general consensus against the 
imposition of slave-like labor conditions as a form of punishment in theory, 
in practice, low-paid or unpaid prison labor has been a longstanding feature 
of prison life in the United States. The extraction of the labor of prisoners in 
the United States can be traced back to the first prisons built by European 
colonialists in the 1600s.114 The first carceral systems in colonial America 
depended on prison labor for financial support.115 The pecuniary costs of 
maintaining the penal system were directly transferred to the prisoners.116 
The prison administration accomplished this by renting out the labor of 
prisoners to private enterprises or by compelling inmates to produce goods 
for sale.117 In this way, inmates were obliged “to pay for the expenses of 
staying in the prison, including all transactions between entry and 
discharge.”118 While many would argue that the original goal of prison labor 
in the United States was to promote an ascetic ideal of self-abnegation and 
 
 112 Id. at 399 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 113 Id. at 405 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
 114 See DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 19–26 
(1995) (chronicling the development of American prison labor to sixteenth-century European 
“workhouses” in which “[l]abor was a major component of the confinement”); Timothy J. Flanagan, 
Prison Labor and Industry, in THE AMERICAN PRISON: ISSUES IN RESEARCH AND POLICY 135, 139 
(Lynne Goodstein & Doris Layton MacKenzie eds., 1989) (“[W]ork has been a feature of American 
corrections here since institutions have been used as a mechanism for correcting offenders.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners’ Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 345–70 (1998) 
(discussing the development of modern prison labor starting from early years of the United States). 
 115 Harry Elmer Barnes, The Historical Origin of the Prison System in America, 12 J. AM. INST. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 35, 37, 50 (1921). 
 116 SHICHOR, supra note 114, at 29. 
 117 Id. at 28–30. 
 118 Peter J. Duitsman, Comment, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private Sector Solution 
to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2209, 2214 (1998). 
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discipline,119 prison labor has taken on a more profit-driven capitalist tenor 
since the nineteenth century.120 In what has been described as “the golden 
age” of the American penitentiary121 following the American Civil War, the 
rise of public prisons run by private contractors foretold the expansion of 
prison labor.122 
The Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century was a major 
factor123 that drove the expansion of prison labor under the “lease” system, 124 
as states started to “lease” inmates to private companies as cheap labor.125 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the lease system was most prevalent in the Southern 
states after the Civil War and the end of slavery.126 Pursuant to the lease 
system, inmates worked for little or no pay on plantations, railroads, mines, 
and other business ventures that required inexpensive, unskilled labor,127 
with the goal of producing the maximum financial profit for the 
entrepreneurs who leased the labor.128 
Prison labor as an industry declined in the early twentieth century due 
to various factors. First, it faced criticism regarding the subjection of leased 
 
 119 See SHICHOR, supra note 114, at 30 (arguing t h a t  prison work in early America was 
introduced primarily “for purposes of repentance and institutional discipline to control inmates”); 
Edward Dauber, HARVARD CTR. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Judicial Intervention in Prison Discipline, 63 J. 
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 200, 221–22 (1972) (discussing the perception of prisoners’ rights 
and the idea that judicial intervention in the prison discipline system was not thought necessary until the 
early 1970s); Vernon Fox, Analysis of Prison Disciplinary Problems, 49 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & 
POL. SCI. 321, 322 (1958) (describing the primary techniques of the system of prison discipline). 
 120 Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 451 (2005) 
(“[T]he history of nineteenth-century American prisons is a history of contracting between the 
state and private interests for the use of convict labor in efforts on both sides to achieve financial 
gain.”); see also PAUL W. KEVE, PRISONS AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF 
U.S. FEDERAL CORRECTIONS (1991) (providing an in-depth analysis of the aftermath of the 
American Revolution and the subsequent expansion of the American penal system during the 
nineteenth century). 
 121 See Flanagan, supra note 114, at 139–41. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See SHICHOR, supra note 114, at 26–28 (1995) (“The development of the penitentiary . . . was 
integrally related to rapid industrialization . . . . Because the modern prison was developed during a period 
of rapid industrial development in the Western world, it fit into the system of mass production.”). 
 124 Dolovich, supra note 120, at 450–51. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 
19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 185–222 (1984) (detailing the use of the lease system in 
Southern states during the Reconstruction era). 
 127 MICK RYAN & TONY WARD, PRIVATIZATION AND THE PENAL SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE AND THE DEBATE IN BRITAIN 18 (1989) (“Plantation owners, railway companies and 
mining corporations, all queued up to lease prisoners and work them more or less as 
slaves . . . .”). 
 128 See AYERS, supra note 126, at 193 (“The lease system was tailor-made for capitalists 
concerned only with making money fast.”). 
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convicts to abusive conditions.129 Second, prison labor faced attacks from 
labor unions because it had dampened the wages of all workers.130 Yet, prison 
labor is once again flourishing today because such labor is viewed as the 
solution to the problems linked to the cost of incarceration.131 One of the most 
visible proponents of prison labor, Chief Justice Warren Burger argued: 
Most prison inmates, by definition, are maladjusted people . . . . They do not 
share the work ethic concepts that made this country great. They were not taught 
at home—or in the schools—the moral values that lead people to have respect 
and concern for the rights of others. Place that person in a factory, . . . pay that 
person reasonable compensation, and charge something for “room and board 
and keep,” and we will have a better chance to release from prison a person able 
to secure gainful employment. Added to that it will be a person whose self-
esteem will at least have been improved so there is a better chance that he or 
she can live a normal life.132 
The use of prison labor, while not universally embraced, still enjoys 
considerable support today,133 particularly since it is seen as an efficient 
method for inmates to learn job skills and gain some income, all while 
contributing to their own upkeep.134 Approximately 50% of the inmates 
housed in state or federal prisons work in some type of job assignment while 
 
 129 Dolovich, supra note 120, at 452. 
 130 See RYAN & WARD, supra note 127, at 19 (arguing “the opposition of organized labour [in the 
early twentieth century] turned out to be decisive” for reducing use of prison labor in the United States); 
Garvey, supra note 114, at 358–370 (identifying opposition from labor organizations as cause of decline 
in prison labor during this period); see also Duitsman, supra note 118, at 2215–16 (attributing decline to 
human rights critiques, pressure from labor movement, and “desire to use prisons for reformatory 
purposes”). 
 131 See NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, BRIEF ANALYSIS NO. 245, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
PRISON LABOR 1–2 (1997), www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba245.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MRJ-F4ZQ] 
(arguing increased use of prison labor could reduce taxes, help prevent recidivism, and improve the 
economy); George D. Bronson et al., Barriers to Entry of Private-Sector Industry into a Prison 
Environment, in PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM 325, 325–26 (Gary W. Bowman et 
al. eds., 1992) (“[T]he inmates receive positive gain by . . . [use of inmate labor]. They are able to learn 
work skills [and] earn additional income . . . .”); see also Kathleen E. Maguire et al., Prison Labor 
and Recidivism, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3–4, 13–14 (1988) (highlighting 
“economic appeal” of prison labor and its usefulness in distracting prisoners from “idleness,” 
but demonstrating through quantitative methods that prison labor does not significantly 
reduce instances of recidivism in convicts). 
 132 Warren E. Burger, More Warehouses, or Factories with Fences?, 8 N.E. J. ON PRISON L. 
111, 116 (1982). 
 133  Whitehouse, supra note 108, at 89.  
 134 George D. Bronson et al., supra note 129, at 326 (arguing that there is a rehabilitative benefit 
when prisoners are compelled to work to pay for their room and board). 
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incarcerated.135 As noted by Noah Zatz, “prison industries generate $2 billion 
in revenue annually.”136 Momentarily setting aside the legal and ethical 
implications of prison labor,137 the fact that corporations successfully benefit 
from the labor of imprisoned individuals raises the question of whether or 
not those same corporations should then be allowed to dismiss formerly 
incarcerated job applicants. For illustrative purposes, Table 1138 below lists 
some prominent American-based companies with large employee bases that 
use prison labor and that also generally do not hire formerly incarcerated 
individuals. 
  
 
 135 See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the 
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 868 n.30 (2008) (citing 
employment statistics for inmates). 
 136 See i d .  a t  868–69 (citing CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., THE 2002 CORRECTIONS 
YEARBOOK: ADULT CORRECTIONS 118, 124–25 (Camille Graham Camp ed., 2002)). 
     137 One of the authors, Ifeoma Ajunwa, discusses the ethics of prison labor practices and the corporate 
social responsibility of private firms in another paper. 
 138 This is not at all an exhaustive list and is being offered only for illustrative purposes. 
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TABLE 1: COMPANIES THAT USE PRISON LABOR AND FAIL TO EMPLOY THE  
FORMERLY INCARCERATED139 
 
If prison labor is deemed an appropriate vehicle to enable prisoners to 
gain job skills, why then should companies, who ostensibly have benefited 
from those same job skills while a formerly incarcerated individual was 
behind bars, also have the power to reject the same individual when she 
presents herself in the private labor market? If prison labor is to serve any 
form of rehabilitative goal, then it stands to reason that formerly incarcerated 
individuals who have taken it upon themselves (or been compelled) to gain 
skills valuable in the labor market should have the equal opportunity to 
exercise those skills. 
 
 139 Most of the data we could find on employment of the formerly incarcerated came from online 
search forums because policies against hiring the formerly incarcerated are not always publicized on 
company websites. The data for the companies listed can be found either at 
https://helpforfelons.org/companies-that-hire-felons [https://perma.cc/HN7V-A26T] or 
http://www.jobsforfelonshub.com/jobs-for-felons [https://perma.cc/RU32-NUAU]. 
Company Name Uses Prison Labor? Employs Formerly 
Incarcerated? 
McDonald’s Yes Franchises—some will, 
others will not. No blanket 
bans. 
Walmart Yes No, in most cases. The 
company reports that it 
does hire felons, but has 
extremely strict criminal 
background checks. 
Victoria’s Secret Yes Depends on the conviction. 
AT&T Yes Requires that your 
conviction is at least 7 
years old. Still are not 
considered a “felon 
friendly” employer. 
Wendy’s Yes Franchises—some will, 
others will not. 
K-Mart Yes Depends on the conviction. 
John Deere Yes No, in most cases. 
Bank of America Yes No, in most cases. 
State Farm Yes No, in most cases. 
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In fact, one potential solution to private labor market discrimination 
against the formerly incarcerated might be recognizing the low-paid work 
that many of the incarcerated do on behalf of corporations. The state penal 
institutions that lease prisoners to such corporations could push for a 
contractual agreement which stipulates that corporations will abrogate  
policies that bar the formerly incarcerated from employment and that seek to 
inquire about criminal records, as those policies could have a chilling effect 
on formerly incarcerated job applicants. 
This genre of contractual obligations finds legal precedent in the 
obligations that the government enforces on its private contractors, who must 
abide by higher standards of workplace diversity and ethics.140 When it 
comes to removing the barriers to employment for the formerly incarcerated, 
some focus must be on dissuading private firms from discriminating against 
the formerly incarcerated. Note, for example, that the EEOC advised in a 
recent policy statement that using criminal background checks for 
employment purposes would violate the law if the checks are used to 
intentionally discriminate against minorities or if they have a demonstrably 
adverse discriminatory impact on minorities.141 Consequently, employers are 
advised against using blanket criminal record checks in their hiring 
decisions; the checks should instead relate to “business necessity.”142 This 
focus on preventing private firms from discriminating against the formerly 
incarcerated has led to “Ban the Box” (BTB) movements in several states 
and cities, and as a result of such efforts, many cities have adopted policies 
that make it illegal for employers to include questions soliciting information 
about an applicant’s criminal record at the initial application stage.143 
 
 140 Employers are required to meet certain affirmative action obligations if they do business with the 
federal government and are covered by the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 503, the Vietnam Era 
Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Executive Order 11246, or the Jobs for Veterans Act. 
The threshold amounts for these laws typically begin at the $10,000-contract level, and compliance 
requirements increase as the amount of the contract and the size of the contractor’s workforce increase. 
An affirmative action program is a management tool designed to ensure equal opportunity in recruiting, 
hiring, training, promoting, and compensating individuals. Affirmative action goes beyond equal 
employment opportunity measures, requiring employers to eliminate discriminatory conditions, whether 
inadvertent or intentional, and to treat all employees equally in the workplace. See Government 
Contractors: What You Need to Know, BLR https://www.blr.com/HR-
Employment/Discrimination/Government-Contractors [https://perma.cc/9SKJ-FF3W]. 
 141 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See BAN THE BOX CAMPAIGN, http://bantheboxcampaign.org [https://perma.cc/C5TB-RRR3]; 
Pamela Q. Devata et al., Trends in the “Ban the Box” Movement: Recent Developments in City 
Ordinances, LABOR AND EMP’T LAW COUNSEL (2016) 
https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2016/05/trends-in-the-ban-the-box-movement-
recent-developments-in-city-ordinances [https://perma.cc/A2G8-ME2V] (indicating that twenty-six 
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However, the efficacy of BTB policies is yet unproven, and some 
preliminary studies may even indicate that they have undesirable effects.144 
For example, a Yale Law School study on the BTB movement and its effects 
on employment discrimination found that employers who ask about criminal 
records are 63% more likely to call back an applicant if he has no criminal 
record.145 Additionally, the study showed that BTB policies—where 
employers refrain from asking about criminal records at least until a 
conditional offer of employment is made—encouraged statistical 
discrimination on the basis of race.146 Specifically, the study showed that, 
before BTB, white job applicants to employers who asked about criminal 
records “received 7% more callbacks than similar black applicants, but after 
BTB [that] gap grew to 45%.”147 These potential effects of the BTB policy 
point to another contractual solution for remedying private firm 
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated. Contracts between state or 
federal prisons and private corporations could mirror the diversity initiative 
imposed on federal contractors. In this way, private firms that make use of 
prison labor could be contractually required to employ at least some 
percentage of formerly incarcerated individuals.148 
As discussed above, employment is crucial to reentry, regardless of 
whether or not the formerly incarcerated are seen as a special class. Thus, we 
must still consider carefully whether excluding the formerly incarcerated 
from gainful employment—without any scientific evidence supporting the 
benefits of such exclusions—serves the larger societal goal of reintegration 
after incarceration. 
 
cities and counties have adopted some form of BTB legislation as of 2016, including New York City, 
Philadelphia, San Francisco and Austin, Texas). 
 144 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt Low-Skilled 
Workers? Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories Are Hidden, 
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (July 2016) http://www.nber.org/papers/w22469#fromrss 
[https://perma.cc/HH6Y-BK9R]; Christina Stacy & Mychal Cohen, Ban the Box and Racial 
Discrimination, URBAN INST. (Feb. 2017) 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88366/ban_the_box_and_racial_discrimination.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7Q3L-VYUZ]. 
 145 Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Discrimination: A 
Field Experiment 4 (2016), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/workshop/leo/leo16_starr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SPN4-D74C]. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See supra note 140. 
112:1385 (2018) Combating Discrimination 
1415 
CONCLUSION 
In Greek Mythology, Prometheus disobeys Zeus and steals fire for 
humans.149 As punishment, Prometheus is chained to a rock in the Caucasus 
Mountains where, eternally, his liver is eaten daily by an eagle only to 
regenerate and be eaten again.150 To our modern sensibilities, this type of 
perpetual punishment (in fiction) is exceedingly harsh. Yet, in the real world, 
our society has routinely condoned the collateral consequences of 
conviction, including labor market discrimination against the formerly 
incarcerated, which effectively punish, in perpetuity, the formerly 
incarcerated for the crimes that they have already paid a debt for. In so doing, 
our society has only undermined efforts to reintegrate the formerly 
incarcerated. Furthermore, given the significant numbers of racial minorities 
who have been incarcerated (some wrongfully), continued punishment in the 
form of collateral consequences seems not only particularly punitive, but 
also racially discriminatory. Indeed, the rejection of the formerly 
incarcerated by corporations that rely on prison labor appears hypocritical 
and without rational basis. Most of all, we should question whether a lack of 
equal opportunity for the formerly incarcerated on the labor market means 
their permanent designation as an economic underclass and whether this 
ultimately betrays the principles of fairness and equality foundational to 
American democracy. 
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